The power of the State to alter the conditions of use of land through planning laws continues to attract attention and theorisation in terms of the possible intersection between planning and property. As planning laws become more complex, and by needs responsive to environmental degradation-including the consequences of climate change-land owners will arguably suffer loss in terms of the market value of their land even as the broader community might benefit. This article analyses the contention that land planning regulation is itself property-a claim made by Paul Babie in this journal in 2016. It does so in four parts, focusing on the way in which the law itself constructs concepts of both real property and of planning permissions. It analyses the nature, content, and source of the estate in fee simple in Queensland, followed by analysis of James Penner's 'bundle of rights' argument to ascertain whether planning laws might feasibly be comprehended within this conception of property. It goes on to assess a planning permission in terms of Honore's incidents of property before establishing the nature, content, and source of planning rights. Finally, it distinguishes the role of planning law in responding to climate change, suggesting that it is downstream liabilities rather than front-line environmental protection that is at stake.
original planning provision, and therefore also of the State Government's Direction for its reversal.
The estate in fee simple is the greatest estate known to the law-'the highest and largest estate that a subject is capable of enjoying'. 9 Contrary to an intuitive assumption about property in land, technically the estate is not ownership of physical land itself. Rather the estate is the far more abstract notion of a legal right to possession of the land. 10 Further, and what gives an estate its characteristically broad extent, is that it will last for an indeterminate period of time. 11 Lastly, the common law is clear that the right of alienation is intrinsic to the estate itself, and the courts will strike down an attempt to restrain alienation. 12 Regardless of the theorisation of the concept of property that might underlie diverse interests in land, and regardless of the contentions of government ministers, 13 these three factors: a legal right to possession, its indeterminate term, and freedom of alienation, constitute the estate in fee simple as a question of law.
In terms of my statement in the blog post that 'ownership' in land is widely conceived of as a bundle of rights, there are clearly a number of ways in which the freeholder might deal with the composite rights that comprise their fee simple. The legal right of possession might be alienated by transfer of the freehold, or a right of possession granted for a fixed or determinate term 14 (ie the land might be leased). Rights of user such as easements might be granted, or the land might be put up as security. In this way, the freehold estate might be fragmented into multiple co-existing interests. The rights that comprise the grant however are derived from the terms of the State grant which at the outset, establish the boundaries of the freehold estate-the real property.
In his article, Babie has, however, extrapolated from the State's role in establishing the boundaries of the freehold estate to explain that my argument was really that:
what Seeney is saying in issuing the direction, apart from recognising the power of the state to shape what property means, is that the state . . . was going to take no action to prevent landholders from acting in ways that might cause negative externalities for other Queenslanders. Or . . . that the Queensland government would take no action to address the consequences of climate change. 15 As Babie claims that 'regulation is property' and that Mr Seeney and I are in fact in agreement that restricting a 'right' to build restricts property, it seems that underpinning his restatement of my argument is an assumption that the State, through regulation, will continue to shape the content of property rights after the original grant of freehold.
Certainly, it was my contention that the State has power to shape what property means. 16 However, I did not intend to imply that the State through building or planning regulations would continue routinely to shape real property rights following the grant. My view was and remains simply that the source of all land grants in Queensland is the State. 17 In granting land, the State exercises its radical title, perfecting full beneficial ownership and creating an estate in fee simple. 18 The content, or constituent rights of-property in-that estate are prescribed by common law, statute, and the terms of the grant itself. 19 The State routinely reserves certain rights 20 and has historically imposed terms upon the grantee as to the use of the land, to promote the development objectives of the State. 21 The State's radical title effectively assures it an ongoing interest in the land as a disaggregated aspect of its sovereign power, and the right to resume land is inherent in the State-an incident of its radical title. 22 The State thus retains a right to take land, and to constrain its use according to principles of good governance. 23 My contention is thus that the nature and content of the collection of rights comprising the estate in fee simple is shaped by the State through the terms of the initial grant and its reservations.
It is true also, that the State may exercise its power to add to or take away from the rights comprising the freehold estate. For example, the Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) and the Geothermal Energy Act 2010 (Qld) each provide for access to freehold land, for the holder of an authority 24 or a tenure 25 respectively. Such access provisions constitute an exception to indefeasibility under Queensland's Torrens statute where access has been granted before the titleholder became the registered proprietor. 26 22 See, eg, Edgeworth (2017), p 1157. 23 See, eg, Longo (1983) . 24 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld), s291. 25 Geothermal Energy Act 2010 (Qld), ss20-21. 26 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), ss 185(1)(i), (j).
property arise through State regulation, which might support a contention that regulation per se is property. However, the content of both the interests created in geothermal and greenhouse gas storage resources (for example) and the way in which they were created, are more likely to paint them as property than permissions under a planning scheme. Unlike planning permissions, their standing as property is reflected in the bounds of the indefeasible title which itself reflects the content of property in freehold. However, if new exceptions to indefeasibility are regulation, and if 'regulation' was in this example 'property', it does not follow that all regulation is necessarily property.
In addition to substantive real property rights, there may also be diverse incidents associated with an estate in fee simple. For example, co-owners as between themselves hold a range of rights including a right to possession of the whole, 27 and a right to an account of profits. 28 Joint tenants hold a right of survivorship. 29 However, despite the nexus of these rights with land and the owners, and their role in mediating relations between the parties, none of these rights is properly considered property. 30 permissible floor space for buildings on that land, they can transfer the 'surplus' to another parcel of land. The question in this case was whether these rights (to transfer unused development potential to another site) were interests in land.
The Court held that transferable development rights are not interests in land. 32 Such rights merely allow one landowner to confer a benefit on another landowner (the right to develop land more extensively than they would otherwise be permitted). Certainly, and aligned with Babie's broader contention, transferable development rights in this case were found nevertheless to be proprietary rights: 'They are transferable, and I assume transmissible; they are of large commercial value; and I see no reason why they are not "proprietary" rights in the same way as … patents or shares in a company are "proprietary" rights.' 33 If Babie's contention is that the right to build forms part of the incidents of the freehold estate, then Immer would contradict this argument. Adopting the reasoning of Meagher J the Moreton Regional Council planning permission (to build) is not transferable, nor transmissible-although it might afford some additional value to the owner of the land to which it attaches. On this reasoning however, it is unlikely that such a right will be found to constitute an interest in land regardless of its likely effect on land value.
Babie argues that 'regulation is property'; that property does not exist without regulation. 34 The implication of his argument is that he subscribes to Seeney's position, namely that there exists a 'right to build' that is a property right, and that the State may alter that property, through regulation, to avoid harm to others. 35 Alternatively, if the 'content' of the freehold estate might be more accurately described as a bundle of rights beyond the scope suggested here, the more theoretical possibility arises that the 'right to build' comprises one of the 'sticks' in the bundle that constitutes the estate in fee simple.
Fee Simple as a Bundle of Rights
Despite the popularity of the bundle of rights conception of property-and it is eminently possible to comprehend the freehold estate as a 'bundle' or collection of different rights-the concept loses its potency where it is used in an explanatory way to articulate the nature of property itself. Penner, for example, argues that the 'bundle of rights' does not resolve the question of the content of property rights. Indeed, Penner suggests that such a conception falls into the trap of comprehending property as a thing, rather than as the means of regulation of relations concerning a thing: 'the bundle of rights view does not get us beyond the obligation to understand property in terms of a right to a thing. ' 37 In what Penner describes as a 'disaggregative version' of the bundle of rights approach to property, the notion of property is constructed from the aggregation of each possible use for that thing. 38 The difference between the two concepts of property can be put in this way: We actually conceive of property in terms of a right which permits an owner to do anything or nothing with his property; the disaggregative bundle of rights thesis insists that an owner may do everything with his property. The former view accords with the fact that the law of property takes no interest in the particular use one makes of one's property (which is not to say that criminal law or the law of taxation does not); the latter holds that the essence of property is an infinite number of rights to use a thing, in the same way that the Hohfeldian idea of a right in rem entails having millions of rights against all other people. 39 If Babie's contention is that a right to build forms part of the bundle of rights comprising the freehold estate, Penner's disaggregative approach appears to describe Babie's explanation of the right to build. It would also comprehend his suggestion that regulation is property in that each time a government edict affected any conceivable use of the land concerned, that regulation represents part of the bundle of rights that 'is' property in that land. 'This view emphasizes in the strongest fashion that the very nature of property is that of an infinitely divisible composite, which can be disintegrated into or built up from less extensive rights.' 40 By contrast, Penner prefers an account of property as a 'unified legal relation'. 41 While there are descriptive elements of the bundle of rights theory that serve to explain the nature of freehold interests, understanding the estate as a unified whole better reflects the state of the A preferable characterisation of such a right is as a planning right and Penner's case study of licences-'the owner's changing the contour of the right to exclude in order to facilitate someone else's use' 51 -illustrates the potential for the content of non-property interests to elide with property proper. A planning permission might be construed as stemming from, or affecting the right to exclude-and to permit-possession of land. However, adopting Penner's argument, a planning provision need not 'pre-exist [its] creation'. It is 'created de novo '. 52 If planning provisions are indeed de novo permissions or restrictions (as the case may be), their character is very different from that of property despite sharing appearances. My preference for Penner's argument, however, directly contrasts with that of Babie, who maintains that 'the right to develop always existed; its scope was merely expanded and narrowed by Seeney and Trad respectively.' 53 While Babie is entitled to hold a different view, it is incorrect to assert that the argument in my original post supports the contention that regulation is in fact property.
To advance the argument, and to test whether the right to build might itself be property, it is possible to analyse it using Honore's incidents of property. To the extent that the right to build involves a right to possession, it arises from the estate in land. Unlike the transferrable floor rights in Immer, the right cannot be alienated separately from the estate, and there is no attendant possibility of income from the right. Such rights bear no relationship to any right to build which is distinct from real property and its incidents.
The right to security implies that ownership continues for as long as the owner chooses, and remains solvent. 54 This is not present in a right to build. Likewise, and again, unlike the order to respond to the challenge or (sic) climate change.' 70 I understand him to mean that the challenges of climate change include the important consequences listed above.
For the sake of clarity, my original post did not go further than to identify the concerns of the Moreton Regional Council with liability arising from landowner losses accompanying sea-level rises. I did not contend that preventing building approvals for land likely to be affected by sea-level change would constitute measures to prevent climate change or its direct consequences.
If liability for planning approvals on inundated land is a 'consequence of climate change' disquiet of freehold land owners at the prospect of having their behaviour regulated-even as they themselves stand to lose in the face of a rising sea.
Conclusion
Although I have here explained why I disagree with Babie's interpretation of my argument, Babie and I do have more in common than we differ. We agree that the State constructs the boundaries of real property, and that the State retains the power to alter the way in which real property is used. We agree that effective regulation has an important role in mitigating the relentless march of climate change, and also in preparing communities for primary and secondary consequences. We might be said to agree on the concept of property. 71 denying that property might be conceived of differently according to diverse method and theorisation.
There is no doubt that property and the markets it serves warrant scrutiny in terms of their effect on environmental destruction, including climate change. It is true that the way in which planning law is constructed and applied could do better at supporting environmental ends. 75 However, the very issue that Babie purports to describe, namely that there is not only a relationship between planning regulation and property but that they are the same thing, is a conceptualisation that runs counter to the existing framework of the law. The law itself generates the very environmental challenges that we seek to overcome, notably from the fact of the separation of property and planning; from property and environmental concerns. This is no theoretical separation. Rather, it is a question of law and its taxonomies. This was the uncomplicated purpose of my original post.
